INTELLIOEKCE AGENCY
9
HE BOARD
SUBJECTi Some Animadversions Regarding tha Hatter of the "Klsaile Gap"
e tine endured in silence, iorthe pain occasioneduantity of talk aboutlmT/licatinns the "missileish to seekthisey no claim to knowing all the answersto this extraordinarily crmplex matter. o layknowing that mor* answers are needed than are usuallyby those who speak positivelyhethe "missile gap,"
about the "nLflslle gap" begins with the
affirmation that sometime12 the USSR will havo
a substantial number of ICEH'fl and the US will have few. So
farnow, this much is fact. his point on, however,
those who view with preat alarm tha implications of this fact
5 e rrst recent and final stab of discomfort, leading directly to this outcry.administered by the remarks attributed to Mr, rhillp Hoaoly in Staff, "Meeting of the Cfnaultsntalncaton,ndtowember.
APPPCVEE FOB REUUI L'ATE: fflf
make assumptions and net judgmentsort which .ire usually described as "war-gardng." Nov "war-gaming" does net product) Incontestable facts. Indeed, inhorent in its natureertain circular relationship between assumption nnd result which is notorious among professional practiotlonershe war-game. As one emlnont researcher in these realms. General Curtis LeKay, has said with characteristic plainness,our assumptions1 tell you your results." Hy view regarding the assumptions generallyby theorijers-of-the-missile-gap Is thati (a) they ascribe perfection to the Russians and imperfection to ourselveaj (b) they ignore or pass lightly over some hard military factsi and (c) they posit an extremely unlikely situation ln the realm of international affairs.
3. Those who find extreme peril ln the "Vilssile cap" usually credit the USSR with havingOM's ojeratl^nal1 It Is true that our studies into my mind tho most sophisticated and thorough exercise as yet undertaken anywherethis subjecthave demonstrated that possession ofumber of ICSK's on launcher12 rejresents such an extraordinarily difficult achievement as to make it unlikely. But then we may be wrong, so let us proceed
to tho next point. These rdsslles, it is assumed, are targeted against the bases of the Stretegic Air Coraand, and they are timed to arrive with perfect surprise on all these bases simultaneously. onsequence, SAC is caught with its planes down, and the US nuclear retaliatory capability is obliterated or reduced to proportions which the Soviet air defense system car, deal with, or can reduce again to proportions which make the level of damage it can inflict on the Soviet Union acceptable to Soviet planners.
ii. The underlined phrases in the paragraph above represent points at which major assumptions must be made regarding the interaction ln this hypothetical military engagement. We start, appropriately, with surpriseappropriately, because as we shall see here and later, surprise is the absolutely essential element; without it the wholestructlon comes apart,
5. It is fair to say that surprise, explicitly the danger of being surprised, is recognized by SAC as its most acute problem. In response, this superbly trainedequipped force, which has seldom lacked for funds, priorities, or elite personnel, hascomplex, interlocking systoms and procedures to guard against surprise, SACumpy and alert-happy force. There
is little, if any, exagseraticai in saying that if small fires were to break cut simultaneously in the paint lockers of three or four sac bases in tho world, the bombers of the sac alert force (numbering in theombed-up and fully fueled, would within approximatelyinutes take off and head for their assigned targets in tho ussr. after the several sac base commanders had investigated the paint locker fires, and the possibility of sabotage as an accompaniment to soviet attack had been set aside, the bombers would be recalled to base and new alert aircraft would take their place on the alert strips. so little as this has alerted sac many times in the past and will do so again. ersonally believe that there has never been aforce more difficult to surprise than sac.
6, ave just mentioned the sac ground alert force. besides its capability for maintaining between one-fourth and one-third of its bombersminute ground alert, sacaps-billty for airborne alert. at present, sac cannail
5 in thisinute pround alert" means that bomberequisite number of tanker aircraft, and their crews are at all times fueled, bombed-up, and briefed onassigned targets. five minutes after the alert is sounded the first alert alroraft leave the runwayj the rest of the alert force pets off at intervals of one to two minutes, "airborneanpereontacehe force is kept constantly aloft, shuttling out and back part way along the assigned routes to the designated targets.
percentage of ita aircraft on acntinucua airborne alert ani can, under ecerceccy conditions sucheriod of International tension, put substantial proportions of tfce force on airborne alert for several daysine. The point about all this is that no nusber of ICWs canAC bcuber once it isani en route to its tercet. SAC can, therefore, frustrate the aseuued Soviet riiseile superiority at any tine by putting its cocked aircraft aloft. The percentage cf the alert ferae which is aloft atthe hypotheticalhen the Soviet nisilies detonate on SAC bases la apprcocLnatoly the percentage with whichlet air defense system will have to cope, and this we will diseuss later.
7. Bare, hcvever, we Day note lnecondary point re&ardlsc the assuced sisultanecus arrival cf the Scvlet ulsfiles on target. At present there exlstB considerable skepticismaWn.-u. aup'jftc rsaariloc the feasibility of causing several hundred aissUes, originating fron points hundreds of dies apart, tc lap act slmltaneously oa targets also hundreds cf ailes apart.
This akeptloisa derive* largelyetailed understanding of the encroou* ccciplexlty ond tochnlcol uncertainty of the niaslle at the stage of its development anticipated between nowut thoro is also avollahle to anyone who lives in the roal world ancther source of hoalthy skoptlclsn. Bunan affairs, as ve acta daily while searchhg for misplaced car keys or balancingcheckbooks, are constantly going askew. When those affaire ore allltary la nature, this tendency, as historians hove recorded and those of us who were adultsave observed, reaches now heights. As Colonel George A. Lincoln is credited with noting in Staff, the Soviet allltary operation envisaged by the dsslle-gappers surpoosee in scope and perfection any allltary operation ln history, unless we aesuae such perfection in tbe natter of simultaneity, however, we oust adult that when op-prcxlnately five nlnutes pass between the arrival of the first Soviet XCXfX anywhere In the US end the first detonation on any given SAC baae, the alert bonbere begin taking off from that base and othurs will follow every passing minute* This number, its else depon the number end length of the time intervals Involved, must be added to tho number vhioh will confront the Soviet air defense.
5. Nov we turn to the second major assumption underlined in paragraphhe assumed capability of tho Soviet airto deal with the SAC bcnbers not destroyed by ICJjKs. uppose that the effectiveness of air defense against jet bombers ranks, along with the efficacy of airborne electronic countermeasures, as the most vexing and disputed questionmilitary plannere these days. The air attaok-defense equation is extremely oomplex and constantly shifting/ and in the absence of testing under combat conditions no one has any definitiTo data. Among those who study these matters there is teneral recognition, however, that the USSR has beer, investing heavily in air defense. This awareness has caused SAC to intaaaUfy ite efforts to devise equipment and techniques which will augment its ability to penetrate tho Soviet air defense.onsequence, SAC has developed the capability to mount an assortment of attaoks, variously designed to exploit thevulnerability of air defense systems to low-leveldeception, saturation by mass, stand-off weapons, and airborne electronic countermeasures. It may be that in time the manned alroraft will be no match for air defense missiles, but at present two teohniques provide considerable
ossuranoe that withineriod the balanae will not awing wholly against attacks (a) tha use of low-level approaches to the target, ccabined with specially designed weaponsthe aircraft to stay low throughout its bombing run} and (b) tho uae ofiles) air-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads for blsstiog out air defense sites. Another tactlo which could degrade the effectiveness of air defense is use of the so-called dead-man fuse. Thisevice which causes the nuclear weaponhot-down aircraft to detonate upon impact. These weapons vould not of ooursen their assigned targots but they would in most oases land on Soviet soil. Each one, be it remembered, wouldulti-negatcn detonation.
9. The Importance cf all this, in relation to the missile-gap problem, is that in this hypothetical situation the odds are favorable fcr some SAC bombers to get their bombs down on the USSR. No one to my knowledge ever postulates that all the attacking bombers will be shot down by the air defense. The attrition, factor frequently employed In professional war games ranges fromo 8fJ percent. Seme bombers always get through. My own view isUeable fraction of the attacking forcesay, about one-thirdwould probably get through in this assumed situation.
10. This brings us bo th* third major assumptionin paragraphhe assumed willingness of Sovietto accept indeterminate amounts of nuclear damage. Here, of course, we enter an area where nothing is known. eel confident ln saying that oven ln the USSR no onenot evennows how much nuoleor damage would be acceptable* But one thing does seem certain on this question, and that ia that those who easily assume that the USSR would willinglyuantity of nuclear damage are guiltyajor failure in constructive Imagination. Up to tbe present,no one haa observed the effectnlti-negaton detonationodern city, let alone the effect) of such detonationsodern country. We do know that the havoo and chaos at Hiroshima was indescribable* Dut then, one night anawor, Mosoow is not Hiroshima and tho Russians are not Japaneso. To this one must rejoin, yes, but no art; no longer talking aboutiloton weapons*
H* It is sometimes argued by the missile-gappera that the Russians in World War II displayed considerable fortitude In accepting millions of casualties and thereforeouple cf million again* To me, this comparison is
utterly Irrelevant. In the first plaoe, in this situation the Soviet leaders aro assumed to to deliberatoly acceptingcf this order* In World War XI,emember correctly, they were attacked first and their casualties were sustained while repelling an invader. Out far more important, to sustain casualtiesa-aaroated military frontay-by-day basis over several years time is vastly different from sustaining such casualties over an entire countryatter of hours. The impaot of an airborne nuclear atWek cf multi-megaton weight on the complex mechanisms of modern civilisation would be most profound. The shook to the population of millions of simultaneous casualties would transcend anything the world has seen. ersonally doubt that the Soviets oould willingly accept Just one lOnttegaton detonation cn Hoaocv* In this hypothetical situation, they would be risking the receipt of scores and hundreds of nulti-megaton weapons, not only on Moscow but widely throughout the country they have struggled so to modemlzo during the past forty years.
brings us, it seera to ma, to the very nubmatterhe risk and the degree of assurancerisk. Before initiating the -ttteck posited by thotheoriters, the Soriet planner would have to assess theassurance he could obtain that the U$ retaliatorynot inflict on the Soviet Union sojie unspecified amount
of damage. How much assurance could he get? In dealing with this question, one ought to make evtry effort to see the problem from the Soviet point ofoint of view, in short, which permits one to see the enormous strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of the US nuclear delivery capability, and ono from which one oan soo tho possibility thet the Soviet attack might not fo off exactly as planned. No militaryave ever met wants to setilitary operation without lots of assurance of success. Thoy all want to be very sure.
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the Soviet military planner surveys the problemwhat does he see? ?irst of all, he sees the SACpossessing the biggest punch of any military force To defeat it, he must surprise it. Not justit, but completely surprise it. This means hehis political superiorseriod of political relaxation
is essential for his purposes.eriod of international tension, he has no assurance tnct ho can s'.-rprise SAC. Moreover, to think of Raking an attacklackmail attempt horrifies hln. Threats, maybe; an actual attack, no. SAC would certainly be alorted and substantlil nunbors of its bombers airborne. He must have oor.plete quiet.
It. Mindful of his need for surprise, the Soviet military plannor is disturbed also by tho reports he has rooeived about the US Ballistic Hissilorning System. Soae of his experts ore skcpticil that the US BMaWS could function rapidly enough to permit SAC to get tho ground alert force airborne. He knows,that the system wns designed to give warning of the firing of XCBK's in the first mlnutos of thiirminute flight.an who has considerable respect for the electronic Ingenuity of the Americans and who is searching hard for assurance regarding surprise, this is disturbing. He finds it hard to be suro.
15. Next, the Sovi.it milit-jy planner looks at the US ICBM capability. It Is not, by his assumed standards, large, and it is1 mostly soft-sited. n he appreciates theneed for surprise, bec-uso alerted Americane held for long periods of timemlnuto, or less, posture of readiness.
He also knows that any which aro not hit on his first salve will be fired and once on their way cannot be stopped, Similarly, he knows that tho OS .Polaris-equipped submarines ere operational at this time, and each submarineoad ofissiles with nuclear warheads. His chances ofolaris attack are negligible;damage his country will almcst certainly receive is far frcn negligible.
16. Finally, he turns his attention to the US Sixth Fleet In the Mediterranean and the US Tactical Air Command in Western Europe. Tho threat represented by these forces is not really large by tho appalling standards of the nuclear era, but the forces are there and the Soviet planner must have some assurance that they will be dealt with. He recognizes at the very least that severe problems of timing ore prosanted by his necessity to launch strikesarge number of targets in Western Europe and its periphery, such strikes to arrive simultaneously with the ICBM's on North America. He realizes alsohe preparations necessary to tako out these forces may ieopirdixe his attainment of surprise and without surprise he cannot succeed.
17. Having made his survey of tho forces opposing him, what docs the Soviet military planner conclude? elieve that even
18, Supposeacoepts tho contention that nossession by the USSRuperior number of ICBM's does not necessarily have the dire implications drawn from it by some observers. Docs this permit us to be complacent about tho Soviet ICBM capability? Far from it, hink that the present Soviet ICBM capability and the probable achievementumerical superirity12 have profound significance in the US-Soviet power balance. The Soviets now have positive assurance that they can Inflict enormous and crippling damage on the TJS under any of the circumstances which may precipitate general war. hink, is the true and accurate meaning of their ICBM capability, and it has wide-reaching implications, Tho Soviets are now liberated from tho one-sided threat of our onoraou3 nuclear capability. For people afflicted with deep feelings of inferiority this isimportant. It bestows greater flexibility on theirof military power to obtain objectives. Likewise, since their possession of an "equalizer" accords thorn the status of an equal, to say the least, they are enabled tc pursue policies of relaxation without fear they may appear to be supplicants. The powerful can afford to appear benign. xpect that Soviet policy henceforth will be far more menacing, waon it is menacing, and far more
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if he fives himself the hi cheat degree of assurance military planners ever0 toercent, and grants himself the achievement of complete surprise, he will still face someconclusions. He will find as he tots up the nuclear megatonnage that ho cannot be sure of warding offthe fraction cf the SAC forces airborne or escapes domape, the ICBH's he does net hit, the Polaris auta-rinoa, the carrier-based Jetthe TACegaton hereogaton there add upignificant total. ersonally believe that the totalf our assumed planner wouldegatons, at the very least. To be sure, these megatons would not all be delivered cn target, but the Soviet planner recognises that whereas the attacker needs precise accuracy for success the defender only enough to cause substantial damage. He knowsegatons delivered even at rmdem on the USSR would cause enormous damage. o not see how any responsible Soviet military planner could obtain assurancesolid, militarily-defensible assurancethat the level of damage from the US retaliatory attack would bo less. herefore believe that this planner, and anyone else who looked hard at the mil'tary realities, would strongly advise Against the leunching of the assumed attack1
conciliatory when it ie conciliatory. xpect it to be free-swinging and hardo not expect it, suddenly on some quiet day, to seek fulfillment of its ambitionsingle gigantic gamble, when the odds for complete success are net great and the potential losses are catastrophic.
R. J. SMITH
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Original document.
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